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l Poli sh - Rus sian re la tions have ne ver been good, but for the
sake of Eu ro pe an se cu ri ty and sta bi li ty they sho uld be
im pro ved, par ticu la r ly in the time of a cri sis which
chal len ges the who le world. 
l Rus sia un der Pu tin sta r ted to re bu ild its po si tion as
a re gio nal su per po wer and be gan re de fi ning its role in the
world. Thus, it sho uld come as no su r pri se that Po land and
ot her co un tries of the re gion felt thre a te ned by the se signs
of the re vi val of Rus sian im pe ria lism.
l To day Rus sia stands on the cros s ro ads whe re the
neo -i m pe rial am bi tions, fu el led by the stre am of
pe tro dol lars, meet the new re a li ty of cri sis. In such a cri ti cal
si tu a tion the op tion of the state’s di sin te gra tion can not be
ru led out. This wo uld pose a di rect thre at to the co un tries of
our re gion.
l The Oba ma ad mi ni stra tion of fe red a new, so f ter ap pro ach to
Rus sia. This so - cal led “re set but ton po li cy” of in clu ding
Rus sia as a pa r t ner ra t her than ex c lu ding or alie na ting it was 
wa r m ly we lco med by the old EU me m ber sta tes. The Cen tral
Eu ro pe an co un tries were more sce p ti cal. Pre si dent
Medvedev’s sta te ment abo ut the pla ce ment of Iskan der
ro c kets in Ka li nin grad and the ne w ly an no un ced do ctri ne
of bu i l ding “the sphe re of Rus sian pri vi le ged in te rest”
(“the near ab ro ad”) de epe ned this di strust.
l The Poli sh- S we dish Ea stern Par tne r s hip Ini tia ti ve can be
a sti mu la ting fa c tor for bu i l ding the sta bi li ty and se cu ri ty in
the re gion if both pa r ties – the EU and the co un tries co ve red
by the EP – tre at it se rio u s ly eno ugh.
l The in ter na tio nal com mu ni ty sho uld co o pe ra te with Rus sia
with a gre at dose of di s c re tion, ca u tion but also
dete r mi na tion. If Rus sia wants to be a pa r t ner for Wes tern
de mo c ra cies, Russia’s le a ders have to fol low the set of wi de ly 
re co g ni sed in ter na tio nal stan dards.
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1. Poli sh - Rus sian re la tions: a geo po li ti cal/hi sto ri cal
per spe c ti ve
The re cord of Poli sh - Rus sian re la tions has a cle ar de va sta ting con no ta tion.Sin ce the time when the Rus sian em pi re and Polis h-Lit hu a nian Kin g dom – two eme r ging po wers in this part of Eu ro pe – con fron ted each ot her over the
do mi na tion of the re gion, hi sto ry has no ted nu me ro us ho sti li ties, con flicts and wars.
When in the 18th cen tu ry Po land lost its sta te ho od, part of its ter ri to ry was
inco r po ra ted by Rus sia as a re sult of the pa r ti tion deal with Au stria and Prus sia. Af ter
re ga i ning its so ve rei gn ty in the af te r math of World War I, Po land was at ta c ked twi ce
by Rus sia (So viet Union) in 1920 and 1939 (this time in an al lian ce with Nazi
Ge r ma ny). The Ya l ta ac cord, cre a ting the new glo bal or der af ter World War II, made
Po land a sa tel li te sta te sub or di na ted to the So viet Union un til its col la p se at the end of
the 1980s. Thus, it is not su r pri sing that such a hi sto ri cal re cord ge ne ra tes a bur den of
ne ga ti ve emo tions and pre ju di ces. Al t ho ugh today’s Po land is a me m ber of the EU
and NATO, this fatal Russian factor still plays an important role in shaping the
mindset of Poles and influencing regional politics.
The Russian perception of Poland is also affected by the past hostilities, and one
could say that Moscow has a Polish complex. The establishment of Den Narodnovo
Edinstva – National Unity Day – in 2005 demonstrates it rather well. This holiday
commemorates the national uprising led by Kuzma Minin and Dmitry Pozharsky,
which ousted the Polish troops from Moscow in November of 1612.
It should be stressed that the Polish perception of Russia operates on two levels. The
Kremlin and Russia’s state institutions can be seen as a threatening factor or enemy, but 
there is no hostility towards the Russian people, who were often seen as the victims of
an oppressive regime. The Polish collective memory remembers the cases of Russian
democrats’ support for the Polish uprisings against the tsar and his empire. Contrary to
the stereotype of Polish Russophobia prevalent among the public opinion in Western
Europe, most Poles are able to distinguish the system of power which implements the
imperial policy from the Russian people at large. This could make a good grounds for
the Polish-Russian reconciliation process (until now Poland managed to reconcile itself 
with Germans and Ukrainians), but without the involvement of the two countries’
political elites such a process cannot succeed. A normal bilateral relationship based on
trust is impossible without such reconciliation.
Now it seems that the present rulers of Russia are not prepared to launch a dialogue
with the Polish side (this issue is not even at the bottom of their agenda). There are
also some significant political groups in Poland which can react to such an idea with
scepticism. However, Poles are generally interested in maintaining good
neighbourhood relations with Russia, but under certain conditions. A good opening
for improving the bilateral Polish-Russian relationship could be the genuine
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cooperation of Moscow in fully explaining the case of the murder of 22,000 Polish
officers by the Soviet NKWD in the Katyn Forest (1940). For most Poles Katyn
became a symbol of the evil of the Russian/Soviet imperialism. If Moscow would be
able to initiate talks with Warsaw over this crime, the way to the reconciliation
process could be opened.
2. Russia’s new po li ti cal in stru ments and the rise
of neo -i m pe rial am bi tions – con se qu en ces for Po land
and the region
Rus sia un der Pre si dent Pu tin sta r ted to re bu ild its po si tion as the re gio nalsu per po wer and be gan re de fi ning its role in the world. Af ter cra s hing theChe chen upri sing with a bru tal vio la tion of hu man rights, Vla di mir Pu tin soon
be ca me an im po r tant pa r t ner for the US and the EU (in fi g h ting ter ro rism and Is lamic
fun da men ta lism and in se cu ring the ene r gy sup p ly to the then bo o ming EU
eco no my). By re ga i ning the full con trol of the sta te stru c tu res, he se cu red his
lea de r s hip po si tion and then pas sed the pre si den tial of fi ce to Dmi try Me d ve dev.
Thro u g ho ut the last ye ars Rus sia be ca me an aut ho ri ta rian neo -i m pe rial co un try with
a sta te con trol led me dia, dy ing NGO se c tor and mar gi na li sed, op pres sed op po si tion.
The jo u r na lists who tried to in ve sti ga te the ca ses of cor ru p tion and sta te cri mes were
kil led by un k nown as sas sins in my ste rio us cir cu m stan ces, and the oli garchs op po sing 
the re gi me had to flee the country or were arrested and then sent to a penal colony
(as was the case with Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the founder of Yukos oil company).
Benefiting from the economic boom and high prices of energy, Russia claimed to
soon become an equal partner of the United States, weakened by its involvement in
two wars. The EU was not even considered to be any serious competitor to Russia.
The Kremlin knew well how to play the game of splitting European unity.
Pro-Kremlin experts promoted a vision of Moscow and St. Petersburg quickly
becoming the new financial centres of the world.
The new political instruments were invented and successfully tested:
n Ene r gy – gas & oil as to ols for po li ti cal/eco no mic ex pan sion (gas con flict with Ukra i ne)
n Fro zen con flicts – as a tool for ju sti fy ing mi li ta ry in ter ven tion un der the pre text of
pro te c ting the rights of mi no ri ty gro up/Rus sians or the ir al lies (war in Ge o r gia).
Mo s cow be gan using mi li ta ry rhe to ric in its po li ti cal sta te ments and ma ni fe sted its
ne w ly re ga i ned po wer (the vi sit of Rus sian wa r s hips to Ve ne zu e la, re ne wing its
re la tions with the Ca stro re gi me, ma king ter ri to rial cla ims to the Ar c tic, and
an no un cing the esta bli s h ment of CIS ra pid re a c tion task fo r ces as coun ter ba lan cing
NATO and the re turn of the Rus sian navy base to the Medi ter ra ne an). All the se steps
gre a t ly re se m b led the old So viet sty le po li tics.
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It is not surprising then that Poland and other countries of the region felt
threatened by these signs of Russian imperialistic revival. As a result, Poles and
Czechs soon inked an agreement with the US for hosting the elements of an
anti-missile shield on their territories. In response the Russians blackmailed the
West with a prospect of installing Iskander rockets in the Kaliningrad oblast. The
Balts, Poles and other Central European nations began asking “difficult
questions” about NATO Charter’s article 5 and scenarios for defending this region 
against a possible attack from the East. Poles negotiated with the Bush
administration that the battery of the Patriot defence system would be stationed on 
Polish soil. Moscow spoke about defending its “sphere of privileged interest” in
the region. The spirit of a new Cold War lingered in the air. But today’s
neo-imperial Russia has no real allies in its closest neighbourhood. Until now,
even Belarus did not recognise the independence of the Russia-backed separatist
republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
3. Eco no mic cri sis ta r ge ting Rus sia
No wa da ys, Rus sia stands on the cros s ro ads whe re the neo -i m pe rial am bi tions,fu el led by a stre am of pe tro dol lars, meet the new re a li ty of cri sis. For Mo s cow it is a pa in ful pro cess to ack now le d ge that the che ri s hed dre am of be co ming
a glo bal su per po wer is over. The unem p lo y ment rate is dra sti cal ly gro wing, the
eco no my is shrin king, and the na tio nal bank is de fen ding the we ake ning ru b le by
pu m ping hard cur ren cy re se r ves into the fi nan cial se c tor. Di sil lu sio ned Rus sian
pe o p le have be gun to ex press the ir fru stra tion and an ger in spon ta ne o us pro tests
which have been sha king the co un try from Vla di vo stok to St. Pe te r s burg. The
in ter na tio nal me dia have sta r ted spe cu la ting abo ut the split be twe en Me d ve dev and
Pu tin over de aling with the crisis. Rumours are spreading about the growing
opposition to Putin within the inner circle of power.
It seems that soon the budget of Russia could be unable to meet its obligations and to
pay international debts, people’s salaries and pensions. In such a situation the
scenario of the state’s disintegration cannot be ruled out. This will pose a direct threat
to the countries of our region. In the past Russia demonstrated to the world that in the
time of crisis the preferred solution is to find an outside enemy who could be blamed
for all problems and then to unite people under the patriotic slogans about defending
national interests.
Having this in mind, the international community should work with a great dose
of discretion, caution but also determination. It has to be clear that if Russia would
like to become a partner for the Western democracies, its leaders have to follow the
set of widely recognised international standards.
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4. Poland’s per ce p tion of the EU and the US po li cy
to wards Mo s cow
Af ter the Rus sian in va sion in Ge o r gia, the West re a c ted al most una ni mou s ly by con de mning Mo s cow for its ac tions. Not the US, but the EU and the Frenchpre si dent Ni co las Sar ko zy pla y ed the ma jor role in bro ke ring the pe a ce
ne go tia tions. Rus sia was sin gled out as the ag gres sor, NATO su spen ded the
NA TO - Rus sia Co un cil, and EU - Rus sian re la tions were fro zen. Po land ma na ged to
use this mo men tum for si g ning the agre e ment with the Bush ad mi ni stra tion on
ho sting the anti - mis si le shield on its ter ri to ry in re turn for the US pro mi se to send
a bat te ry of Pa triot ro c kets as Wa r saw has re qu e sted. This deal sent a cle ar si g nal to
the ou t si de world that Po land sees Russia’s neo -i m pe rial po li cy as a thre at to re gio nal
se cu ri ty.
A new chapter in the American policy towards Russia was opened by the Obama
administration, which offered a new, softer approach to Russia. The message is that
the US might reconsider the plans for installing the ABM shield in Central Europe if
Moscow helps stop the nuclear programme in Iran. This so-called “reset button
policy” of including Russia as a partner rather than excluding or alienating it, was
warmly received by the old EU member states. An important issue of the Western
agenda was arms control and the prospect of signing a new nuclear non-proliferation
treaty with Russia.
The Central European countries (especially Lithuania) were more sceptical of this new
policy. For them this “inclusion” meant a repeat of the same tactics towards Russia
which did not work in the past. The media reported that such a split of attitudes towards
Moscow significantly lowered the chances that Radoslaw Sikorski, the Polish Foreign
Minister, would be appointed to the post of NATO Secretary General. Berlin and Paris
agreed that the appointment of a Pole would send a wrong signal to Moscow.
5. Ger man - Rus sian re la tions – the Po lish con text
Wa r saw clo se ly mo ni tors the de ve lo p ment of the Mos cow- Be r linre la tion s hip. Hi sto ry has pro ven that a Ger man - Rus sian al lian ce hasal wa ys cre a ted pro blems for Po land. The at ti tu de of op po si tion pa r ty
le a ders (PiS – Law and Ju sti ce pa r ty) to wards Be r lin is open ly cri ti cal. The ru ling
coalition’s ap pro ach be ca me more sop hi sti ca ted. Tusk’s go ve r n ment ma na ged to
re set the in he ri ted, al most fro zen Poli sh- Ge r man re la tions. Thro ugh pa y ing one of his 
first vi sits to Mo s cow he also de mon stra ted to the pa r t ners in the EU his good will for
im pro ving Poli sh - Rus sian re la tions. Al t ho ugh he pas sed the test of be ing open to
a dia lo gue with the Kre m lin, the war in Ge o r gia soon al te red the Po lish prio ri ties.
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Moscow’s in ter ven tion swi t ched on the red alert lamp, re min ding Po les that not so
long ago Po land was fo r ced to be co me a So viet sa tel li te. Medvedev’s sta te ment abo ut 
in stal ling Iskan der ro c kets in Ka li nin grad and the ne w ly pro cla i med do ctri ne of
bu i l ding “the sphe re of Rus sian pri vi le ged in te rest” (“the near ab ro ad”) de epe ned the
di strust, and when af ter the last gas cri sis Be r lin be gan in si sting on la un ching the
Ger man - Rus sian Nord Stre am gas pi pe li ne pro ject, Poland’s im me dia te re a c tion was
to ob struct this ini tia ti ve as threatening its national interest. As a matter of fact, since
the very beginning there was no disagreement on this subject between the opposition
and the ruling coalition in Warsaw.
Berlin’s move of promoting Nord Stream also met with a very cold welcome in
Sweden, a country which together with Poland proposed the Eastern Partnership
Initiative (EaP). In spite of earlier fears that Berlin and some other old EU countries
might block the extra funding already promised to finance the Eastern Partnership
(which would result in lowering the political impact of this initiative) an important
decision has been taken to earmark 600 mln Euros for the project. This will not make
Russia happy, because all the countries covered by the EaP fall under the terms of
Moscow’s new “near abroad” definition. While Germany advocates the policy of “not 
excluding Russia”, Warsaw is in favor of “including” it but under certain conditions,
such as the recognition of the right of all countries to determine their alliances and
select their friends. This basic right is definitely contradictory to the “near abroad”
philosophy of Russia.
6. Po land and Ukra i ne as fron t li ne pla y ers
For Po land, Ukra i ne is a stra te gic pa r t ner in Ea stern Eu ro pe. The suc cess ofde mo c ra cy in neig h bo u ring Ukra i ne me ans for Wa r saw re gio nal sta bi li ty andse cu re bor ders. The se ob je c ti ves de te r mi ned the Po lish sup port for the Oran ge
Re vo lu tion and ba c king for the EU and NATO aspirations of Kyiv.
Russia’s view of Ukraine differs from the Polish one. Moscow sees Kyiv as the
“nearest neighbourhood”, an immanent part of the Russian civilisation which should
be returned to the motherland. For Russians, the Western Ukrainians with their UPA
tradition are the followers of fascism and traitors. Since the time of Ukraine’s
independence Moscow tried to regain its influence over the former Soviet republic by
using different means. The Orange Revolution ended with a spectacular failure of
Russian diplomacy. Then the Russians began using a new range of instruments, such
as gas cut-offs, corruption and black PR, whose effectiveness is hard to assess.  Today 
Ukraine is in a deep political and economic crisis, which could undermine the
functioning of the state. The deepening chaos might push Kyiv closer to Moscow. In
such a situation the EU should show more determination in keeping Ukraine on its
westward path because this is essential for a more secure and prosperous Europe.
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Poland as an EU border country has a crucial role to play in this process. Warsaw’s
policy towards Ukraine should be more proactive and has to respond to the new
dramatic challenges facing the region. But in order to be effective, such a policy also
needs the backing of larger old EU member states and a blessing from Brussels. The
Polish-Swedish Eastern Partnership Initiative can be such a stimulating factor if both
parties – the EU and the countries covered by the EP – treat it seriously enough.
7. Con c lu sions & Re com men da tions:
n Rus sia is not a stra te gic pa r t ner for Po land, but it is a stra te gic pa r t ner for the US
and the EU, and this fact sho uld be re co g ni sed by Po lish policy makers.
n Po land, as the la r gest Ea stern EU border co un try, sho uld ela bo ra te and start
im p le men ting a re gio nal lon g - term stra te gy to wards Ea stern Eu ro pe and Rus sia ba sed 
on the EU/NATO prin ci p les and con sen sus wor ked out be twe en the main po li ti cal
pa r ties. Such a stra te gy sho uld take into con si de ra tion all po ssi b le sce na rios of
de ve lo p ments.
n Po land sho uld bu ild its re la tions with Rus sia thro ugh wor king with EU and NATO
co un tries, con stru c ting re gio nal co a li tions of in te rest (which will not harm the uni ty
of the EU and the Trans at lan tic Alliance).
n The EU and the US sho uld take into con si de ra tion dif fe rent sce na rios of
de ve lo p ments in cri sis- stri c ken Rus sia. The West sho uld ela bo ra te plans for as si sting
Mo s cow in ove r co ming the eco no mic cri sis if the Rus sian lea de r s hip de ci des to give
up neo -i m pe rial am bi tions and open the co un try to de mo c ra tic re forms. Ho we ver, if
Russia’s le a ders cho o se the con flict sce na rio, the EU and the US sho uld be pre pa red
to de fend de mo c ra cy in the region and to confront the militant position of Kremlin.
n Wa r saw sho uld work with its Eu ro pe an and Ame ri can pa r t ners to help stren g t hen
the po si tion of NATO in the region.
n The Po lish po li cy to wards the Ea stern Eu ro pe an co un tries sho uld co m pri se the
wi der re gio nal di men sion sti mu la ting the se countries’ co o pe ra tion un der the
fra me work of EU ini tia ti ves such as the Eu ro pe an Neig hbou r ho od Po li cy, Ea stern
Partnership, and Black Sea Synergy.
n Prio ri ty sho uld be gi ven to stra te gic co o pe ra tion with Ukra i ne, espe cial ly now in
the time of deep eco no mic/po li ti cal cri sis that Kyiv fa ces. In spi te of the “Ukra i nian
fa ti gue syn dro me” Wa r saw sho uld con ti nue its sup port for Ukraine’s Euro -A t lan tic
am bi tions for the sake of regional security and stability.
n The ene r gy se cu ri ty is sue is high on the Po lish agen da due to its de pen den ce on the
Rus sian sup p ly and the trans it ro u te to the EU. Po land sho uld stron gly pro mo te the
con cept of the EU com mon ene r gy po li cy ba sed on so li da ri ty and diversification.
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n The bi la te ral Poli sh - Rus sian re la tion s hip sho uld be ba sed on an in ter na tio nally
re co g ni sed set of va lu es. At the same time, the se days prio ri ty sho uld be gi ven to such
non- con trove r sial is su es as economy/business/human exchange.
n Wa r saw sho uld pro mo te among its Wes tern pa r t ners a dual ap pro ach to Rus sia:
wor king thro ugh of fi cial go ve r n ment chan nels but also try ing to re con struct dia lo gue
with mar gi na li sed op po si tion and ci vic gro ups (this field was ba si cal ly gi ven up and
the West con cen tra ted only on one - way con tact with the Kre m lin). Hu man rights
is su es sho uld aga in be co me an im po r tant part of the agenda for dealing with Moscow.
n The Po lish NGO se c tor sho uld ob ta in go ve r n ment fun ding for ma in ta i ning the
par tne r s hip con tacts with Rus sian or ga ni sa tions and cros s - bor der pro jects sho uld be
la un ched, sti mu la ting the ex chan ge of opi nions and pro mo ting de mo c ra tic values
throughout the region.
n Po land sho uld con ti nue wor king on the is sue of the Poli sh - Rus sian dia lo gue,
which – in the long term per spe c ti ve – co uld open a way for the re con ci lia tion
pro cess. Such a dia lo gue sho uld be con du c ted on two le vels: gove r n men tal and ci vil
so cie ty (which at the mo ment is very weak and marginalised in Russia).
n The Ka tyn mas sa c re issue’s de ad lock sho uld not be co me an ob sta c le to pro gress of 
the Poli sh - Rus sian dia lo gue, but it sho uld be made cle ar that the full ex p la na tion of
this cri me is a pre - con di tion for ma in ta i ning the no r mal, neig hbou r ho od relationship
based on mutual trust.
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